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Abstract 
This article explores the topics of Russian diaspora and the politics of culture and 
identity, expressed through Russia’s humanitarian cooperation initiatives. The study posits 
that the Russian cultural diplomacy policy focuses on compatriots living abroad and the 
Russian Diaspora to create and solidify Russkiy Mir [Russian World] communities and 
turn them into Russia’s advocates abroad. The study extends the argument that the 
Russian language is treated as one of the main tools in Russia’s soft power arsenal to 
foster loyal and supportive attitudes toward Russia among the Russian-speaking 
communities. Such policy accentuates language as an important marker of stronger 
sense of belonging and self-identification (in this case with the Russian World) and a 
critical element in the construction of cultural and/or ethnic identity. The study highlights 
the complexity and diversity of Russian Diasporas and Russian compatriots that comprise 
Russkiy Mir, specifically in the United States, and discusses the socio-linguistic factors 
these efforts must take into account in the Russian-speaking Diasporas abroad.  
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Introduction 
In recent years, Russia has rediscovered 
cultural and public diplomacy as a 
means to re-establish the country’s 
presence in the international arena and 
improve its image (Feklyunina 2008). 
Realizing that it has an unfavorable 
reputation worldwide due to Soviet 
heritage, Russia has implemented a 
number of efforts to project a more 
positive image with the main goal to 
diminish negative perceptions and 
traditional stereotypes of Russia (Simons 
2011). In 2005, the Kremlin initiated an 
extensive public diplomacy campaign to 
improve Russia’s image abroad (Orttung 
2010). The arsenal of tools ranged from 
traditional international broadcasting to 
sophisticated efforts that included 
lobbying, nation branding, cultural and 
educational exchanges, and public 
relations counseling services (Feklyunina 
2008; Klyueva & Tsetsura 2015; Orttung 
2010). 
Stemming from Foreign Policy Doctrine 
that focused on developing ‘effective 
means of influence on public opinion 
abroad’ (MID 2007), early public 
diplomacy efforts of Russia largely 
focused on informational solutions to an 
image problem. Russia’s more recent 
efforts have increasingly incorporated 
cultural aspects, restoring Cold War era 
cultural diplomacy institutions and 
growing capacity for effective outreach 
both in the near abroad and the West. As 
a result, Russia has developed a distinct 
cultural diplomacy policy with clearly 
defined goals, strategies and tactics.  
In 2010, the Russian government 
introduced the Cultural Diplomacy 
Conception, which placed a significant 
emphasis on the promotion and 
popularization of the Russian language 
and culture in the world and preserving 
cultural heritage of Russia in the near 
abroad (MID 2010). This conception 
shifted the focus from an attempt to 
foster a positive image of Russia to an 
attempt to foster a ‘pro-Russian’ identity 
beyond the country’s borders, in which 
the Russian language and culture 
became central elements of Russia’s 
strategic cultural diplomacy efforts.  
While Russian public and cultural 
diplomacy efforts have received 
consideration in the research literature, 
the strategic intent behind those efforts 
and the socio-linguistic factors affecting 
them have not been addressed. The 
purpose of this study is to explore the 
politics of culture and identity by looking 
at how the Russian government uses the 
Russian language and Russian culture as 
two central components of its Cultural 
Diplomacy Conception. By examining 
cultural diplomacy initiatives related to 
the promotion and support of the 
Russian language and culture in the 
United States, the study aims to answer 
two main questions. First, what role in 
Russia’s humanitarian cooperation 
efforts is ascribed to the compatriots 
and the Russian Diaspora abroad? 
Second, in what way does the Russian 
government rationalize its cultural 
diplomacy efforts, namely the promotion 
of the Russian language?  
The study relied on primary sources 
obtained mainly from the official website 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation (MID.ru), official 
website of the President of Russia 
(Kremlin.ru), and the website of the 
Russian World Foundation (RusskiyMir.ru). 
Other sources, found using a snowball 
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method, include a variety of secondary 
archives, published research, and media 
coverage. Tentative themes of analysis 
were (1) the strategic motives behind the 
Russia’s cultural diplomacy initiatives; (2) 
the strategic focus on Russian Diaspora 
and compatriots abroad; and (3) the role 
of the Russian language in Russian 
humanitarian cooperation efforts. We 
applied these thematic categories to the 
data deductively, in a search for answers 
to research questions, and in order to 
confirm or disconfirm data. The 
qualitative approach used in this study is 
consistent with the methods of 
traditional humanistic research, as ‘a 
form of empirical inquiry that uses 
theoretical constructs to attempt to 
make true statements about the past’ 
(Nord 1989: 292). 
 
The study starts with the discussion of 
the Russian perspective/approach to 
cultural diplomacy, placing it within 
political context as well as Russian 
academic thought. Thereafter, the study 
reviews the role of the Russian Diaspora 
and compatriots living abroad and 
argues that it constitutes an unofficial 
sphere of influence. Using the example of 
the United States, the article stresses the 
complexity and diversity of Russian 
Diasporas and Russian compatriots that 
comprise Russkiy Mir in the United 
States and places such discussion in 
context of identity formation through 
language. The article concludes with the 
discussion of challenges and 
opportunities of Russian humanitarian 
cooperation initiatives focused on the 
Russian language promotion.  
 
 
 
 
 
The Russian Way: Humanitarian 
Cooperation as Cultural Diplomacy 
 
While culture as an axis of propaganda 
has long been an essential component 
of the Soviet information efforts, the 
practice of cultural and public diplomacy 
in its modern understanding, closely 
associated with soft power (non-coercive 
power of attraction) and integrated within 
foreign policy, came to Russia only after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
(Kelimeler 2013). The term public 
diplomacy in Russian has several 
approximated translations. Often, public 
diplomacy is translated as 
obshchestvennaya diplomatiya [public’s 
diplomacy], publichnaya diplomatiya 
[public diplomacy], or narodnaya 
diplomatiya [people’s diplomacy]. These 
terms have varying connotations and 
significant semantic differences, yet they 
are often used interchangeably (Saari 
2014). As borrowed concepts from the 
Western scholarship, public and cultural 
diplomacy are not customary terms 
within Russian political thought (Sergunin 
and Karabeshkin 2015). A more accepted 
description of public and cultural 
diplomacy activities among Russian 
political elites is gumanitarnoe 
sotrudnichestvo [humanitarian 
cooperation] as illustrated in numerous 
foundational documents of the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID 2016).  
 
Zonova pointed out that the word 
humanitarian in Russian has many 
different meanings that do not always 
coincide with the meanings ascribed in 
other languages (Zonova 2013). 
Traditionally, humanitarian cooperation 
implies cooperation in the spheres of 
human rights, organized crime, or 
human and drug trafficking. In Russian, 
humanitarian cooperation often refers to 
collaboration in the area of culture and 
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science, inter-civilizational relations, 
education and media policies, as well as 
supporting compatriots living abroad 
(Zonova 2013). Therefore, Russian 
cultural diplomacy efforts are often 
labeled as humanitarian efforts.  
 
Humanitarian cooperation programs of 
Russia are enacted via three 
foundational documents: (1) the Cultural 
Diplomacy Conception (2010); (2) 
Russian Foreign Policy Doctrine (2013); 
and (3) the Charter of the Federal Agency 
for the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, Compatriots Living Abroad and 
International Humanitarian Cooperation 
(2008). Many of these programs were 
conceived as means to counteract the 
‘propagandistic’ efforts of the West, and 
the United States in particular, aimed at 
‘containing’ Russia (Cultural Diplomacy 
Conception, MID 2010: 3). For this 
reason, Russian policy-makers see 
cultural diplomacy efforts as an 
instrument of Russian soft power, 
capable of advancing Russia’s influence 
in the international arena (Foreign Policy 
Doctrine 2013).  
 
Of particular interest is the first 
Conception of the International Cultural-
Humanitarian Cooperation Policy, first 
introduced in 2010 and commonly 
referred to as Cultural Diplomacy 
Conception. The document placed 
significant emphasis on the promotion 
and popularization of the Russian 
language and culture of numerous 
ethnicities found in Russia as an 
important contribution to the diversity of 
modern civilization. In the document, the 
Russian language is described as the 
staple of the cultural diplomacy strategy 
and as the most important means for 
socio-political integration across the 
post-Soviet space.  
While the conception advocates for 
promoting the heritage of all diverse 
ethnic cultures and languages of the 
Russian Federation, the Russian 
language is prioritized and elevated to 
the level of a strategic foreign policy 
interest of Russia. Moreover, the 
conception politicizes the use of the 
Russian language by suggesting, ‘it is 
necessary to appropriately resist any 
attempts of infringement or 
discrimination against the Russian 
language abroad’ (Cultural Diplomacy 
Conception, MID 2010: 9).  
 
The importance of the Russian language 
as a tool of social and political influence 
in the far and near abroad was 
highlighted in an addendum to the 
existing Cultural Diplomacy Conception, 
‘Russian School Abroad’ (Kremlin 2015). 
Signed into law by President Putin on 
Nov. 4, 2015, it outlines the priority goals 
and objectives of the Russian 
government in promoting and supporting 
the viability of the Russian language 
across the world, specifically among the 
Russian Diasporas and Russian 
compatriots.  
 
Such focus on Russian Diaspora and 
Russian compatriots abroad represents 
the strategic particularity of the Russian 
humanitarian cooperation and is clearly 
stated in the Foreign Policy Doctrine: 
‘protecting rights and legitimate interests 
of compatriots living abroad on the basis 
of international law and treaties 
concluded by the Russian Federation 
while considering the numerous Russian 
Diaspora as a partner, including in 
expanding and strengthening the space 
of the Russian language and culture’ 
(Foreign Policy Doctrine, MID 2013: 
P39d). 
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Russian Diaspora and Compatriots 
Abroad: Strategic Focus of Russia’s 
Cultural Diplomacy 
 
Due to several waves of immigration in 
the 20th century, world wars and Soviet 
nationality policies, Russians are spread 
out around the world, organizing in 
communities and building numerous 
Russians Diasporas (Krainova 2012). The 
strategic use of the Russian language 
and culture as tools in Russia’s 
humanitarian cooperation, therefore, 
aims to foster pro-Russian sentiments 
among the Russian-speaking 
communities, Russian Diasporas and 
compatriots living abroad. According to 
Astakhov, the basis for this approach lies 
in the realization by Russian political 
elites that there are ‘discrepancies 
between the arbitrarily established 
borders of the Russian Federation and 
actual limits for the spread of Russian 
culture, the Russian language and 
Russian national consciousness’ 
(Astakhov 2008: 5). As such, the virtual 
borders of Russian influence can be 
established through fostering the idea of 
Russkiy Mir (Russian World) – a global 
community of Russians, Russian-
speakers, and those interested in the 
Russian language and culture (Russkiy 
Mir 2014). The Russian Diaspora and 
Russian compatriots living abroad 
constitute the largest Russian-speaking 
communities that comprise Russkiy Mir.  
 
While both Russian Diaspora and 
Russian compatriots constitute Russkiy 
Mir, it is important to note that the scope 
of these terms and, thus, the groups of 
people they describe are quite different. 
Russian Diaspora is generally understood 
as consisting of émigré ethnic Russians 
and Russian speakers and their 
descendants and, while very diverse and 
multifaceted, generally includes people 
who (or whose ancestors) left Russia or 
the Soviet Union voluntarily. Although 
many recent immigrants preserve the 
language and long for cultural affinity 
with Russia, they have also been well 
assimilated in their host countries and, 
by the third generation, their 
descendants often lose Russian as the 
main language of communication 
(Carreira and Kagan 2011). 
 
Different from the above group are 
‘compatriots living abroad’ (Astakhov 
2008: 4), who were cut off from their 
motherland after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, which Vladimir Putin called 
‘the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of 
the century’ (AP 2005: 3). In an often-
misquoted state of the nation address, 
he explained that for the Russian people 
‘it became a genuine tragedy. Tens of 
millions of our fellow citizens and 
countrymen found themselves beyond 
the fringes of Russian territory’ (P3). 
Today, these ethnic Russians and 
Russian-speaking minorities in the post-
Soviet space are essential constituents 
of the Russkiy Mir.  
 
Importantly, compatriots living abroad, 
according to the latest changes in 
Russian law, are defined as any citizen of 
the former Soviet Union, even if he or 
she, or their forebears never lived in the 
Russian Soviet Republic and the Russian 
Federation, thus making any Russian-
speaking individual in the post-Soviet 
space a ‘Russian compatriot’ (Krainova 
2012). In the Law on Repatriation, 
described as an act of Russia’s national 
self-assertion (Vykhovanets and 
Zhuravsky 2013), these people are 
described as those who were ‘raised in 
the Russian cultural traditions, taught 
Russian and wished to maintain ties with 
Russia’ (Law on Volunteer Repatriation of 
Compatriots Living Abroad to the Russian 
	
	
	
  www.cf.ac.uk/jomecjournal         @JOMECjournal 
	
131	
Federation 2006: P4). We argue that 
under the latter scope, the term 
compatriot would then extend to many 
generations of individuals with Russian 
ancestry, including those defined above 
as Diaspora, who may not or no longer 
identify as Russian and whose 
connection to the Russian language and 
culture is potentially conflicted.  
 
The inclusion of Russian Diaspora and 
compatriots living abroad significantly 
expands Russkiy Mir well beyond the 
borders of the Russian Federation and 
even the post-Soviet space and makes it 
a strategic sphere of influence for Russia. 
Kozin maintains that the claim to ‘the 
“outside” Russian communities as 
Russia’s “own”’ (2015: 286) extends the 
national identity outside the Russian 
territory, and an all-encompassing 
definition of a compatriot taps into the 
immeasurable resources of potential 
Russian sympathizers, including those 
within the Russian Diasporas. 
 
Today, about 17 million ethnic Russians 
and Russian-speaking minorities reside 
within the borders of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States alone. In addition, 
Germany (4 million), United Sates (more 
than 3 million) and Israel (about 1.5 
million) are the top three countries with 
the largest Russian-speaking 
communities within the Russkiy Mir (MID 
2016). 
 
To understand the Russian approach to 
cultural diplomacy and its strategic 
intent, it is important to understand the 
Russian view of the Russkiy Mir as well 
as the role and ethno-linguistic 
characteristics of the Russian Diaspora 
and compatriots living abroad. 
Predetermined by many economic, 
political and demographic conditions, 
the focus on Russian-speakers and 
Russkiy Mir presents a conundrum for 
policy-makers. From a socio-economic 
perspective, repatriation and immigration 
of Russians and Russian-speaking 
compatriots could solve many labor 
issues and improve the demographic 
outlook of Russia (Vykhovanets and 
Zhuravsky 2013). From a political 
perspective, supporting Russian-speaking 
communities of compatriots and 
fostering Russian Diasporas could mean 
an outlet for influencing public opinion 
abroad, as shared cultural heritage 
makes Russian-speaking communities 
potential supporters of Russia. 
 
In addition to Russian-speakers, although 
not as its primary goal, as our analysis 
shows, Russkiy Mir also does embrace 
any person who chooses to study the 
Russian language, Russian history or 
culture. As such, Russkiy Mir as a 
community (rather than just Diasporas 
and compatriots) becomes a strategic 
target for Russia to expand its political 
and cultural influence. To preserve and 
foster the Russkiy Mir further, the 
promotion and support of the Russian 
language are prioritized as a focal point 
of Russia’s humanitarian cooperation 
and cultural diplomacy policy.  
 
Some of the burden of executing the 
cultural policy was placed on the Russkiy 
Mir Foundation (Russian World 
Foundation), created by a presidential 
decree in 2007 with the goal of 
‘promoting the Russian language, as 
Russia's national heritage and a 
significant aspect of Russian and world 
culture, and supporting the Russian 
language teaching programs abroad’ 
(Russkiy Mir 2014). Its creation 
demonstrated that a cultural component 
of public diplomacy was now deeply 
integrated within Russian foreign policy. 
In establishing the Russkiy Mir 
	
	
	
  www.cf.ac.uk/jomecjournal         @JOMECjournal 
	
132	
Foundation, Russian government 
solidified the main direction of the 
Russian cultural diplomacy to unite 
Russian-speaking communities abroad 
and turn them into Russia’s advocates 
via promotion of the Russian language 
and culture (Astakhov 2008; Klyueva & 
Tsetsura 2015). 
 
 
The Russkiy Mir Foundation 
 
The Russkiy Mir Foundation is a joint 
project of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Ministry of Education and 
Science. The purpose and activities of 
the Russkiy Mir Foundation are 
consonant with the larger idea of 
building the Russkiy Mir or community. 
The word mir in Russian is polysemic 
and can be translated as ‘peace’, ‘world’, 
and ‘community’. Fostering the Russkiy 
Mir community or communities of 
Russian speakers is one of the essential 
strategic goals of Russian humanitarian 
cooperation initiatives.  
 
While the Russkiy Mir Foundation is 
dedicated to spreading awareness of 
Russian values and traditions to non-
Russians, its main focus is preserving the 
Russian language through reaching out 
to Russians living outside of Russia and 
creating a sense of community among 
them, particularly those in the former 
Soviet Republics (Saari 2014).  
 
In its efforts to disseminate the Russian 
language and culture and to support the 
Russian language study programs, the 
Russkiy Mir Foundation provides grants 
to organizations and individuals aimed at 
promoting translations of the works of 
Russian authors into foreign languages; 
supporting Russian schools in CIS 
countries and the Russian language 
studies abroad; and supporting the 
Russian language instruction in higher 
educational institutions in countries all 
over the world (Russkiy Mir 2014). By 
sustaining these cultural initiatives, the 
foundation strives to affect the formation 
of favorable public opinion about Russia 
through the spread of knowledge about 
Russia and popularization of the history 
and philosophy of Russkiy Mir, which are 
its spiritual and cultural foundations. As 
such, the Russkiy Mir Foundation 
resembles many other cultural 
diplomacy institutions such as the British 
Councils or the Confucius Institute. Yet, 
the active support of the Russian 
community abroad also promotes 
Russia’s geopolitical goals, especially in 
the post-Soviet space where the 
Foundation is most active (Saari 2014).  
 
The foundation attempts to achieve 
these goals through the establishment of 
cultural centers and Russkiy Mir 
cabinets. Russian Cultural Centers 
usually are initiated and fully funded by 
the Russkiy Mir Foundation, and the 
Russkiy Mir cabinets are contract-based 
donations to a hosting organization that 
initiates the process. Russian Cultural 
Centers serve as a support structure to 
popularize the Russian language and 
culture and to provide access to Russian 
cultural and literary heritage. These 
centers are well-equipped and have 
extensive library and video collections.  
 
Through its efforts to get in touch with 
Russians abroad to cultivate a strong 
Russian identity, the foundation aims to 
unite Russian speakers around the world. 
Currently, 105 Russian cultural centers 
operate in 45 countries around the world 
(Russkiy Mir 2016). In the United States, 
Russkiy Mir Foundation operates two 
Centers in New York and Washington 
D.C. and a Russkiy Mir Cabinet in San 
Francisco. As we show later, considering 
	
	
	
  www.cf.ac.uk/jomecjournal         @JOMECjournal 
	
133	
both the size of the Russian-speaking 
Diaspora and the strategic designation of 
the Russian language (Laleko 2013), 
these centers fill an important niche and 
could be instrumental in the success of 
Russia’s humanitarian cooperation 
efforts to target Russkiy Mir in the United 
States. 
 
 
Russian speakers in the United States 
 
Russkiy Mir in the United States is 
comprised of very diverse groups of 
Russian compatriots and Russian 
Diaspora, and therefore Russian 
speakers in the United States have very 
different socio-linguistic characteristics. 
As the promotion of the Russian 
language is essential for solidifying and 
building Russkiy Mir, it is important to 
understand the characteristics and 
needs of Russian speakers in the United 
States.  
 
While earliest Russian settlers pursuing 
economic and religious goals in the U.S. 
were recorded in the Pacific Northwest 
as early as the end of the 18th century, 
their number fluctuated reflecting socio-
economic changes within the Russian 
Empire and its relationship between the 
U.S. over the course of the next century 
and a half. Many of the later settlers in 
that time period due to emigration 
restrictions came from Russia but were 
not ethnic Russians and did not speak 
the language. The first large wave of 
Russian-speaking immigration is typically 
associated with the Bolshevik Revolution 
and the fall of the Russian Empire at the 
turn of the twentieth century. By 1920 
there were 392,049 Russian-born U.S. 
citizens compared to 57,926 ten years 
earlier (Kagan and Dillon 2010). The 
second wave, following World War II, was 
much more difficult to document as it 
consisted of many displaced individuals 
who refused to return to the Soviet 
Union and changed their identities to 
avoid persecution (Shmelev 2006). The 
third wave of emigration from the Soviet 
Union to the U.S. (officially to Israel) 
happened in the 1970–80s when the 
Soviet Union was pressured to release 
political and religious refugees and 
ethnic minorities. Finally, the fourth wave 
occurred after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in the 1990s. Together, these four 
waves constitute the largest influx of 
Russian-speaking immigrants of various 
ethnicities to the United States. In 
addition, the often invisible wave of 
immigration that comprises Russian 
compatriots in the broad sense (e.g. 
those with a language and/or cultural 
connection) is the more than 81,000 
children who have been adopted from 
Russia and the Russian-speaking 
countries in the post-Soviet space since 
the 1990s (U.S. Department of State 
2015).  
 
Russian is currently the eighth most 
spoken language in the U.S. (Kagan and 
Dillon 2010), with 879,434 speakers, over 
400,000 of which report minimum 
English-speaking ability (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2013a) and the latest estimate is 
that 2,762,830 people in the U.S. are of 
Russian ancestry (U.S. Census Bureau 
2014). 
 
This number is more than four times 
higher than 35 years ago (see Table 1), 
and yet it may still not include what 
some (e.g. Kagan and Dillon 2006; 
Dubinina and Polinsky 2013) refer to as 
the fifth wave of the numerous 
temporary or permanent residents 
pursuing job and educational 
opportunities. These groups of Russian 
speakers do not necessarily intend to 
stay in the U.S. and have strong ties with 
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Russia, yet their children may need to 
learn and/or maintain their Russian at 
the age-appropriate level for the time 
they return to Russia (Kagan and Dillon 
2006).  
 
Most Russian speakers in the U.S. do not 
reside in large communities where the 
language can be sustained beyond home 
use. As a result, the language generally 
stops being used after the second 
generation in most immigrant families 
(Kagan and Dillon 2010), even if Russian 
identity is maintained otherwise. Even 
children born to Russian-speaking 
parents and those who emigrated at a 
young age, the so-called heritage 
language speakers of Russian, often do 
not use Russian beyond the family 
domain and as a result may not fully 
acquire it before becoming dominant in 
English or may gradually lose it under 
the influence of English (Kagan and 
Dillon 2010). Similarly, many Russian-
speaking adoptees lose Russian after 
immersion in the English-only 
environment but pursue studying it later 
in life as a means of connecting with 
their roots (Lyon 2009). 
 
According to Carreira and Kagan (2011), 
the majority of Russian heritage learners 
enrolled in college-level Russian classes 
in the United States were born outside 
the U.S. and arrived in the U.S. before 
puberty. For them, the main source of 
exposure to the Russian language is at 
home through parents and community 
(Carreira and Kagan 2011). Consequently, 
many heritage Russian speaking 
members of Russian Diasporas and the 
compatriots lack literacy-based 
knowledge of Russian as well as cultural 
and pragmatic knowledge such as an 
ability to use polite forms of address or 
differentiate between formal and 
informal language (Dubinina and Polinsky 
2013; Laleko 2013). Despite being able 
to sustain basic conversations, these 
speakers, too, need and often seek 
educational support for the maintenance 
of the Russian language and culture.  
 
Interestingly, heritage speakers of 
Russian in the United States identify five 
main reasons for studying Russian 
(Carreira and Kagan 2011): (1) to 
communicate better with family and 
friends in the United States (64.6%); (2) to 
learn about their cultural and linguistic 
roots (59.1%); (3) to communicate better 
with family and friends abroad (44.5%); 
(4) to fulfill a language requirement 
(39.6%); and (5) for professional reasons 
(36%).  
 
Overall, there is a significant need for the 
Russian language instruction and 
educational support among Russian 
Diaspora members and Russian 
compatriots in the United States. Studies 
of heritage language acquisition 
demonstrate the importance of literacy 
and education for maintenance of 
heritage and community languages (and 
of Russian in particular) (Carreira and 
Kagan 2011). Preserving the Russian 
language, culture, and literacy is an 
integral part of identity for Russian 
Diasporas (Isurin 2011; 2014), as well as 
one of the strategic objectives of the 
Cultural Diplomacy policy.  
 
However, there are not enough 
educational opportunities for 
maintenance of Russian in the United 
States, even with the increased activities 
of the Russkiy Mir Foundation and 
despite Russian being designated as one 
of the strategic languages. Russian 
heritage speakers are not likely to have 
received language instruction at a 
community or church school (Carreira 
and Kagan 2011). Thus, even the children 
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of recent immigrants face the risk of 
incompletely acquiring their familial 
language or gradually losing it by 
adulthood (Dubinina and Polinsky 2013; 
Laleko 2013). In this sense, the Russian 
language programs provided within the 
Cultural Diplomacy Conception and the 
‘Russian School Abroad’ program can be 
not only timely but might find quite a 
welcoming reception within the Russkiy 
Mir community of the United States, if 
executed properly.  
 
 
Russkiy Mir: Language and Identity 
 
A close look at the diversity of Russian 
speakers in the United States provides 
insights about the complexity of their 
cultural identity formation through 
language. Cultural identity is the way 
people understand their cultural context 
and their personal value within that 
context; and this is interrelated with and 
dependent on people’s ability to 
articulate their understanding of self 
(Bartlett, Erben and Garbutcheon-Singh 
1996). Language is thus understood as a 
major means of voicing or socializing 
these diverse identities. As such, the 
Russian language for many non-ethnic 
Russian speakers becomes a major 
instrument in revisiting the ‘history-
bound understanding about Russianness, 
Russian national identity and Russian 
culture’ (Kozin 2015: 288) and, therefore, 
extends the scope of the Russian identity 
beyond the borders of the Russian 
Federation.  
 
The role of language as a strong marker 
of various social identities and, thus, as a 
form of linguistic and cultural capital and 
a site of identity construction and 
negotiation, has been widely explored by 
scholars at the intersection of various 
fields of inquiry, and specifically 
linguistics, anthropology, psychology, 
communication, and second language 
acquisition. Most scholarship on social 
identity sees it as graded, multiple and 
subject to change, which is often 
reflected in the linguistic repertoires of 
the speakers. Moreover, these many 
coexisting identities are constructed 
from ‘available categories that both unite 
and divide people in society’ (Laitin 1998: 
16) and are influenced by a number of 
factors, such as gender, culture, 
profession, education, social status, 
religious and other beliefs, and above all 
– ethnicity and nationality. For example, 
there is an interrelation between the 
acculturation of immigrants, second 
language acquisition, and possible loss 
of the first language (see Blackledge and 
Pavlenko 2001; Norton 2013; Remennick 
2007). Thus, for Russian Diasporas and 
compatriots, whose members are 
bilingual and often multilingual, 
languages often delineate the symbolic 
boundaries of communities of which 
they are a part.  
 
Bilingualism studies have shown that 
balanced bilinguals manage to negotiate 
and juggle their ethnic, cultural and 
national identities. However, in 
immigrants, an identity crisis or identity 
shift may coincide with the acquisition of 
the second language at the expense of 
loss or attrition of the first language. 
When one of the identities is threatened 
or challenged, this may result either in 
the increased salience of that identity, or 
in an identity crisis and even identity 
shift, each of which might exhibit itself in 
both what people say and, importantly, in 
what language they choose (not) to 
speak. This is why language support, 
community building, and cultural 
opportunities, such as the ones offered 
through Russkiy Mir Foundation or which 
could be offered through the ‘Russian 
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Schools Abroad’ program, play an 
important role in language preservation 
and support in the maintenance of the 
salience of the Russian cultural identity 
for the members of the diaspora.  
 
When Isurin analyzed the acculturation 
process and identity transformation as 
the outcome for immigrants from 
Russian-speaking Diasporas in the U.S., 
Israel and Germany, all participants 
indicated the importance of the Russian 
language, culture, and community for 
their sense of self (2011, 2014). The data 
from ethnically Russian and ethnically 
Jewish Russian-speaking immigrants 
revealed a complex, often conflicted, 
relationship between ethnicity, 
nationality, culture, and language. Such 
complex identities resulted in both a 
sense of belonging in the host country 
and in a sense of nostalgia for the 
cultural values carried through the 
Russian language from the home 
country. 
 
In addition, no matter how prestigious 
and desirable, the target language and 
culture – including the practices and 
culture of the educational institutions 
that allow access to the majority 
language – may be culturally unfamiliar 
or unclear to the immigrant/minority 
learners. Thus, the learners may not be 
invested in learning the majority 
language and/or becoming part of that 
culture, putting more value in claiming or 
maintaining their minority Russian 
language and identity. For example, 
research on post-Soviet émigrés 
suggests that due to their high level of 
education prior to emigration (despite 
possible downward mobility after it), the 
Russian-speaking immigrants often 
found educational practices in U.S. and 
Israel lacking against the standard of 
their own educational and cultural 
experience (Remennick 2007).  
 
Laitin argued that language policies have 
profound effects on language use, ethnic 
pride and ethnic differentiation (1998). 
Language policies, fueled by the 
ideologies that enforce them, often not 
only favor and value certain groups 
based on the language they speak, but 
also ‘other’, marginalize, or erase other 
groups based on their native language 
(Irvine and Gal 2000). Thus, for Russian-
speaking immigrants, pressure to 
become competent in the English 
language is high, but opportunities to 
master the language and fully become 
members of the majority culture 
community may not always be 
attainable. Although carrying less overt 
prestige than the majority language, for 
first- and even second-generation 
immigrants, their native language, 
Russian in this case, becomes a strong 
marker of ethnic and cultural identity 
(Blackledge and Pavlenko 2001). Kagan 
(2012) found that the majority of heritage 
language learners (i.e. Russian Diaspora 
members studying Russian in the 
universities) self-identify as hyphenated 
Americans or Americans with a dual or 
hybrid identity (e.g. Russian-American or 
American Russians). Some explained 
their self-identification through the 
influence of two or more cultures 
(sometimes drawing on both ethnic and 
national belonging) while others 
emphasized the role of language use and 
proficiency. 
 
Therefore, Russian-speaking 
communities provide fertile soil for 
fostering pro-Russian sentiments 
through promoting and preserving 
language and culture, where networks of 
diaspora serve as a strong predictor of 
practical and symbolic support for 
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members of the network, as well as a 
reinforcement of their shared linguistic 
and cultural norms and resistance to the 
outside language and cultural norms. In 
other words, Russian-speakers who are 
part of a Diaspora are more likely to 
preserve their language, and thus its 
complementing ideology.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Cultural and Humanitarian 
Cooperation Policy of Russia was 
developed in response to the social and 
political changes within the post-Soviet 
space, a traditional Russian sphere of 
influence. Specifically, through cultural 
diplomacy, the Russian government 
sought to consolidate its power among 
the Russian diaspora and its compatriots 
(Sergunin and Karabeshkin 2015). In 
addition, Russia sought to boost its soft 
power through the promotion of a 
positive image of itself, as well as 
through the promotion of the Russian 
language and culture abroad (MID 2013). 
Although the ‘near abroad’ is 
emphasized in the Conception, similar 
goals are outlined for other countries 
where large Russian-speaking 
communities reside, including the United 
States. 
 
Using the example of Russian-speaking 
communities in the United States, this 
study aimed to answer two questions. 
First, we examined the role ascribed to 
Russian compatriots and Russian 
Diaspora in Russia’s humanitarian 
cooperation efforts. These diverse 
Russian-speaking communities are 
strategic targets of cultural-humanitarian 
cooperation programs of Russia that aim 
to solidify Russkiy Mir beyond the 
borders of the Russian Federation. The 
inclusion of Russian Diaspora and 
Russian compatriots into one ephemeral 
community of Russkiy Mir taps into 
immeasurable resources in the form of 
potential supporters of Russia. This 
allows the virtual borders of Russian 
influence to expand via fostering pro-
Russian cultural identity through 
language, not only beyond the fringes of 
the Russian Federation, but also beyond 
the post-Soviet space.  
 
The emphasis on Russian Diaspora and 
Russian compatriots abroad represents a 
strategic difference in approaches to 
cultural diplomacy between Russia and 
the United Sates. The cultural diplomacy 
of the United States, for example, has 
targeted foreign publics with the goal of 
promoting American values through art, 
cinema, music and other cultural 
products (Schneider 2005). In 
comparison, the Russian approach to 
cultural diplomacy bets on the pro-
Russian sentiments among Russian-
speaking communities, thus ensuring its 
success and making it competitive with 
American cultural diplomacy (Klyueva 
and Tsetsura 2015).  
 
The second question asked in what way 
the Russian government rationalizes its 
humanitarian cooperation efforts, 
specifically the promotion of the Russian 
language. The cultural diplomacy and 
humanitarian cooperation efforts of 
Russia focus predominantly on the 
Russian language preservation among 
compatriots and the Diaspora. For 
Russian policy-makers, therefore, the 
Russian language represents a tool for 
influencing collective consciousness and 
public opinion of Russian speakers. 
Sergei Lavrov, Russian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, on numerous occasions 
emphasized the value of the Russian 
language as a tool of Russian social and 
political influence and a means to 
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achieving Russian foreign policy goals 
(Voice of Russia, 2012). As such, Russia is 
focused on re-establishing the status of 
the Russian language throughout the 
world and specifically preserving its use 
to promote Russian national 
consciousness among compatriots and 
Russian Diasporas. As analysis indicates, 
the Russian language is used 
strategically in an effort to build and 
solidify Russkiy Mir, foster pro-Russian 
attitudes and nurture cultural identity. 
Further, the Russian language is treated 
as an important marker of self-
identification and belonging to Russkiy 
Mir.  
 
In addition, the Russian language is seen 
as a softer tool of influence or as an 
instrument of Russia’s soft power. 
However, the soft power of the Russian 
language is limited to Russian speakers, 
Russian diaspora and compatriots living 
abroad. As Konstantin Kosachev, Director 
of Rossotrudnichestvo, observed, the 
successful and effective approach to 
Russian cultural diplomacy is based on 
humanitarian cooperation within Russkiy 
Mir. The promotion of the Russian 
language is an integral part of such 
humanitarian cooperation and is an 
underappreciated resource of Russia’s 
soft power potential (Kosachev 2012). 
Thus, ensuring the preservation of the 
status of the Russian language in the 
world is a priority and a national interest 
of Russia.  
 
The language-centric perspective of 
Russia’s cultural diplomacy – that 
supporting the Russian language abroad 
can be used as a means of promoting 
Russian culture and values beyond its 
borders – has been criticized for its 
imperial inclinations. For example, 
Datsuk critiques Russkiy Mir’s conception 
for trying to use the Russian language as 
a way to norm or somewhat crudely 
adjust people’s way of thinking in ways 
that fit Russia’s ideology (2014). These 
critiques also frame the Foundation’s 
perspective as one that makes a linear 
and oversimplified connection between 
language, cognition and a consequent 
positive view of Russia, along the lines of 
linguistic determinism associated with 
the Sapir–Whorf Hypothesis (1956), the 
strong version of which has been long 
discredited by much cognitive science 
and linguistic research (see Pederson 
2010). What is more relevant to the 
discussion of Russkiy Mir’s investment in 
support of the Russian language abroad 
is the recent scholarship (Norton 2013, 
among others) on the complex 
relationship of language, shared cultural 
knowledge, power, and investment in 
identity construction and negotiation.  
 
Today, the Russian language remains the 
world’s fifth major language and its 
worldwide use is projected to increase 
(Shin and Ortman 2011). Due to a range 
of political and economic factors, 
Russian is once again among the leading 
strategic languages, with a number of 
government scholarships supporting the 
study of Russian both in and outside the 
U.S., and several flagship programs 
preparing speakers at the superior 
proficiency levels. However, despite these 
numbers, to satisfy the needs of the 
Russian cultural diplomacy policy and 
goals, the overall ethno-linguistic vitality 
of the Russian language in the world in 
general and the United States specifically 
needs support.  
 
Despite the status of Russian as a 
language of strategic opportunity in the 
U.S., overall, the availability of educational 
resources for Russian speakers or 
learners is not growing. Based on the 
report from the Modern Language 
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Association, while Russian is listed 
among the languages that require 
‘extended learning periods for native 
speakers of English’ (Goldberg, Looney 
and Lusin 2015: 7), the number of 
institutions reporting enrollments in 
Russian courses has decreased from 
450 in 2006 to 436 in 2013 and Russian 
enrollments dropped by 25.2% in two-
year colleges and by 17.6% in four-year 
undergraduate programs between 2009 
(26,753 students) and 2013 (21,962 
students). In addition, only a quarter of 
the Russian courses offered at the 
advanced level. There is also a shortage 
of community and church-based 
schools, except in large metropolitan 
areas, perhaps due to the inherent 
resistance among the post-Soviet first 
generation immigrants to settling in tight 
communities.  
 
Overall, Russian speakers, and 
specifically heritage Russian speakers, 
need more support and available 
resources for language maintenance. 
This need has not been fulfilled by the 
Russkiy Mir centers and cabinets 
operating in the United States, and 
presents a strategic opportunity for 
Russian cultural diplomacy efforts. When 
policy-makers are to develop programs 
to help preserve the Russian language 
and Russian-speaking communities in 
the United States, they must take into 
account the socio-linguistic factors 
affecting the Russian language 
preservation in the United States. The 
Russian language educators and cultural 
ambassadors targeting the younger 
generation must know the community 
these learners come from and 
specifically know and value its history of 
immigration, as well as literacy practices 
and patterns of language use. Such an 
approach will require additional research 
before designing cultural diplomacy 
programs in an effort to ensure their 
effectiveness and success.  
 
 
 
 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 2013 
Speakers of Russian age 5 
and older 
173,226 241,798 706,242 854,955 879,434 
 
 
Table 1: Number of Russian speakers in the United States. Combined data from U.S. 
Census (2013a) and U.S. Census (2013b) 
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